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8. Innovation of Governance: the Case of 
Emissions Trading1 
Jan-Peter Voß 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
This chapter deals with the relation between governance and innovation. In 
contrast to other chapters of this book, however, it is not primarily concerned 
with the 'governance of innovation', but with the 'innovation of governance'. 
This entails a shift in perspective towards seeing governance not only as a 
design challenge, but also and foremost as a dynamic field of social practices 
and institutions. The practices and institutions that constitute de facto existing 
governance are changing and, from time to time, new patterns emerge and 
spread across domains and jurisdictions. Such phenomena may be referred to 
as instances of innovation in governance (Voß, 2007a). 
This chapter explores how far the development of a new policy instrument 
can be understood as an innovation process in governance. To this end, 1 
adapt the innovation journey f rom Organization and technology studies and 
use it to study the process through which emissions trading came into being, 
h o w it developed, took on dynamics of its own, partly independent of policy 
Problems and goals, spread out across policy domains and jurisdictions, and 
gained dominance as a new design for environmental governance on a global 
scale. 
The analysis shows that the relation between innovation and governance 
entails a high degree of contingency at both ends - not only the challenge to 
think conceptually about new governance forms that can cope with the 
contingency of innovation on science, technology and organizations, but also 
the challenge to induce and navigate complex processes of change in the real 
world of governance practices for envisioned concepts to become real. 
Surprises and unintended effects in the innovation journey of emissions 
trading caution against too heroic an attitude in raising promises and 
proclaiming straightforward solutions to political problems by new designs 
for governance. Rather it shows that ( r e - ) d e s i g n of governance practices is an 
extended process in close interaction with ongoing dynamics in particular 
political contexts. In the course of this process original models become 
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adapted, sometimes warped and distorted. Governance design itself needs to 
be reflexive with regard to its embedding in broader dynamics of change and 
a consequent lack of control over outcomes of reconfiguration processes that 
are oriented towards the shining promise of new model designs. 
In the context of this chapter governance is understood in a broad sense as 
de facto existing patterns of regulation within a particular domain of societal 
interaction. To a large extent such patterns are rooted in institutions that 
emerge from interactions in economic and social life. But there are also 
marked influences of design. Public policy, or governing more generally, is, 
together with other issues, concerned with the (re-)configuration of 
institutions to bring about desired outcomes. The particular techniques that 
are applied to this purpose are referred to as 'policy instruments': specified 
models of governance that guide the design of institutions to steer social 
development into desired directions. The governance of modern societies is 
interspersed with intended and unintended results of the application of policy 
instruments. Understanding governance change thus suggests a closer look at 
them. 
Policy studies commonly analyse change in governance with a focus on 
shifting problems, goals, preferences and beliefs to which policy instruments 
follow suit.2 Here I make a shift in perspective and put policy instruments -
often referred to as 'means', 'tools' or 'techniques' of governance - at centre 
stage (Linder and Peters, 1998; van Nispen and Ringeling, 1998; Salamon, 
2002; Howlett, 2005). I propose to follow the instruments along their life 
cours'e. This allows a new perspective on dynamics in governance; that is, the 
innovation of policy instruments as 'technologies of governance' and their 
impact on the transformation of governance structures. 
In this chapter I use the 'innovation journey' concept to track the process 
by which new policy instruments come into being. This notion was 
introduced by Van de Ven et al. (1999) as a loose concept to grasp the open-
ended nature of innovation in the context of organizations that were 
developing new management strategies, production processes or products. 
Rip and Schot (1999, 2001) have proposed an elaborated and extended 
version for the analysis of technology in a broader societal context. Typical 
phases are the emergence of new options, delivery of proof-of-principle 
through early developments in a protected space, stepping out into the real 
world by experiments with a prototype, and wider introduction and diffusion 
that may lead into the formation of a new technological regime. I build on 
this elaborated concept of innovation journey and explore how far it can be 
transferred to the study of policy instruments as innovations in governance. 
Results from a pilot application to emissions trading are presented in this 
chapter. 
The development of emissions trading had considerable influence in the 
transformation of environmental governance regimes throughout the world. 
The instrument already attracted attention in its early days when it was 
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merely a policy proposal by the US Environmental Protection Agency to 
introduce some flexibility into command-and-control regulation under the US 
Clean Air Act. A close observer at that time noted that: 
... remarkably few reform proposals (.. .) have successfully negotiated the 
perilous path from concept to implementation. Certainly this is not due to any 
shortage of ideas on how existing regulations or the regulatory process could be 
improved (...). Even if only a fraction of the proposals were to prove 
meritorious, the number of implemented reforms would be insignificant 
compared with the number of ideas. The paucity of implemented reforms 
suggests that there may be much to learn from those that did become policy. One 
leading example is the emissions trading program. (Tietenberg, 1985, p. 2) 
Today, about twenty years later, emissions trading has become something 
like a global Standard in environmental governance. With a view to the 
fundamental changes in concepts, institutions and practices of environmental 
policy (as compared to the formerly predominant mode of command-and-
control regulation) emissions trading appears as not only a successful , but 
also a radical innovation in governance. 
What made this innovation possible? Did emissions trading develop and 
break through because new solutions were required for new problems? Or 
does the success of emissions trading signify that policy makers learned how 
to deal with existing problems? The literature on policy change would 
suggest an explanation based on the idea of policy makers learning how to 
better achieve their (shifting) goals or new coalitions with different goals 
gaining power. A side glance at the innovation studies literature, however, 
gives rise to some scepticism. Innovations can develop a life of their own. 
They are not necessarily successful because they perform better, but they 
may become successful because they develop momentan or fit with other 
ongoing changes. Innovation processes are füll of complexities and ironies. 
Success may be the result of the influence of powerful constituencies or 
contingent context conditions and path-dependencies (Nelson and Winter, 
1982; David, 1985; Dosi, 1988; Rip and Kemp, 1998; Van de Ven et al„ 
1999; Garud and Karnoe, 2001). This raises questions about how emissions 
trading actually became what it is. What are its origins, what is its course, 
what are the phases of its innovation journey? Which factors and mechanisms 
shaped its dynamics? How did it become established in the context of pre-
existing governance structures? 
I follow up on these questions by briefly setting out how the innovation 
journey concept can be applied to policy instruments. I present a case study 
that reconstructs how emissions trading unfolded, and how it became 
embedded in existing governance contexts and gained momentan. In a 
separate section I highlight regimes around 'technologies of governance' as a 
new insight into the dynamics of governance. In conclusion I discuss the 
added value of an innovation process perspective on governance. 
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INNOVATION JOURNEYS IN GOVERNANCE 
Most commonly, the term innovation is used for the creation of novel 
products, artefacts or procedures in a commercial environment. More sparely 
it is used for new forms of Organization in the public sector. When using the 
innovation journey concept to study the life of emissions trading as a policy 
instrument, I am looking at a case of innovation in governance. A bnef 
excursion is necessary to indicate what an innovation journey in the realm of 
governance will look like, and how it is visible for emissions trading. 
I use a broad notion of governance that comprises the totality of de facto 
existing rule patterns that regulate interaction within a social domain such as 
a region or a sector of society (Kooiman, 1993; Pierre, 2000; Benz, 2004). 
These rule patterns comprise public and/or private actors as well as codified 
and non-codified rules. De facto existing governance patterns are partly 
designed, partly emergent (Czada and Schimank, 2000). Against the 
background of such a broad notion of governance, political action can be 
understood as the Intervention in de facto governance with the aim to 
reconfigure patterns of interaction and in this way influence outcomes (cf. 
Heritier et al., 1998, pp. 11-13; Kooiman, 2003). 
I understand innovation in governance as the development of new 
'configurations that work' (Rip and Kemp, 1998, p. 338) for the purpose of 
shaping social interaction patterns and outcomes. This involves the 
engineering of hybrid networks of elements with a view to produce a desired 
outcome (cf. Callon, 1987, pp. 93-7; Callon, 1992). The elements of such 
networks do not only include rules in the narrow sense of laws or 
administrative orderings, but also informal norms, financial resources, 
organizational capacities, orientating symbols, theoretical models, social 
actors with certain skills and resources, monitoring systems and databases 
etc. Innovating governance involves the formation and stabilization of such 
hybrid networks. 
The development of policy instruments is a special case of Innovation m 
governance. It deals with the articulation of general, transferable designs for 
undertaking such reconfiguration work. This entails the modelling of network 
configurations that are expected to produce desired outcomes (Braithwaite 
and Drahos, 2000, p. 15). Modelling and reconfiguration work interact. 
Empirical studies of innovation processes in the realm of material technology 
show the difficulties of developing robust designs in interaction with 
dynamic elements and broader contexts. Compromises, unintended effects, 
repair work, setbacks, shifts in form and function are essential features of 
innovation processes. Policy instruments are similarly complex, so that irony 
is in place (Rip, 2006). 
Rip and Schot (1999) develop the innovation journey concept with respect 
to material technologies that are produced and used in a commercial 
environment. The innovation journey concept needs some adaptation for the 
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application to policy instruments. I propose to conceptualize innovation 
j ourneys of policy instruments as emerging from network interactions 
between the poles of science, policy development and governance domains as 
particular areas of application. Relevant areas of science include economics, 
law and the social sciences. Policy development comprises policy analysis in 
national and international public and private organizations as well as Service 
Provision by, for example, law firms, banks, public relations agencies and 
Software developers. Governance domains are policy areas within specific 
jurisdictions, on specific levels of governance, with given policy patterns, 
actor constellations, institutions, material technical and geographical 
conditions (for example the USA's clean air policy or global climate policy). 
Continuing to use concepts and terminology from innovation studies, I can 
distinguish typical phases of the innovation journey of policy instruments: a 
phase of gestation brings up precursors in form of new options, variations in 
practice, emerging pressures on existing governance regimes, but still 
without the interlinkages that make a new configuration. A first critical stage 
shows developments towards linking up elements into a new configuration 
that could work. These developments take place in a protected space, 
shielded from immediate pressures of the political selection environment. If 
they are successful they establish a 'proof of principle' that a new operational 
principle might work to produce a certain type of governance outcome. Partly 
overlapping with this phase, the next phase develops a prototype of a new 
policy instrument with articulated functional principles. First steps are taken 
out of the protected space and into real world governance contexts. 
Experiments with implementation occur when niches open up that can 
provide an amenable local selection environment within the structures of a 
governance domain. Learning and embedding take place within these niches. 
Communities of practice emerge, sharing special experiences and skills. 
After proof of principle and experimentation with prototypes a third phase 
begins, if the instrument is able to branch off from initial niche applications 
into new and wider openings within the original governance domain and 
beyond. If experiences, skills, legitimization, resources, and social Support 
from various implementation sites can be linked up with each other and 
cumulate, the innovation develops momentum and may Stretch or crack 
established governance structures, thus creating further space for expansion 
and diffusion. Enlarged scope and broader diffusion of the instrument lead 
into the differentiation of special skills and services (such as legal advice, 
financing, training), and the emergence of professional institutions and 
organizations that are directly linked up with the policy instrument and its 
further development. Following this phase of expansion and diffusion local 
communities of practice become arched over with organizational structures 
that guard and retain the instrument by providing support for implementation. 
Benchmarks, Standards and certification schemes come up. At this stage one 
can speak of the formation of a regime around the new instrument. The 
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regime cuts across governance domains, and is transnational in scope. It 
stabilizes and supports the policy instrument within particular domains of 
application. 
These typical phases of an unfolding innovation journey manifest 
themselves in the case of emissions trading. In the following section I use 
them to structure the case study. Emissions trading addresses the need to 
regulate the release of harmful gases into the atmosphere by making use of 
the market mechanism. The basic concept is to define a total amount of 
emissions for a population of installations (usually an entire sector of the 
economy), issue allowances for a proportionate amount of this total, and let 
these be traded freely among those actors who wish to produce corresponding 
amounts of emissions. According to economic theory this will lead to the 
optimal allocation of emissions: those who are Willing to pay most for the 
allowance are the ones who face the highest costs of reducing emissions. 
Other ones who have cheap opportunities for emission reductions will prefer 
to exploit them rather than buying permits. Emissions trading thus promises 
that whatever level of emission control is politically required, it can be 
achieved in the most efficient way, at minimal cost to society. Or, the other 
way round, each dollar spent on emission control produces the highest 
possible effect for the environment (Baron and Philibert, 2005; Tietenberg, 
1985; Dales, 1968). 
Figure 8.1 gives a brief overview of the major events and mstances of 
implementation in the history of emissions trading. The vertical axis indicates 
the scope of application of the instrument in various instances of 
implementation. The dotted lines represent informal influences between 
instances of implementation, and the solid lines represent formal legal 
relations. 
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Figure 8.1 Outline of emissions trading's innovation journey 
A qualitative analysis of the dynamics in the innovation journey framework 
is presented in the following sections. I use the adapted innovation journey 
concept, including poles and phases of the innovation journey, when they 
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capture patterns and dynamics that I find in the case study. In this way, I wish 
to provide additional insight into dynamics of governance and show the 
added value of using innovation concepts for governance analysis. 
GESTATION AND PROOF-OF-PRINCIPLE: FIRST 
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SHADOW OF COMMAND-
AND-CONTROL REGULATION AT THE US 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 
In contemporary policy debates emissions trading is treated as if it were 
always around - an unhistorical generic form of governing the environment 
that recently happened to be chosen for implementation. Against this 
backdrop it is inspiring to look back at when emissions trading first appeared 
in policy debates. The reconstruction of wider developments at that time 
actually reveals events and processes in which the instrument took shape. 
Interestingly, emissions trading originated from two different strands of 
precursors, one in science and one in the practice of US clean air regulation. 
The two strands brought up new options such as theories, legal rules, 
legitimating narratives, routines, skills, etc. that could be combined into a 
new type of policy instrument. A first emissions trading programme was 
cobbled together and grafted on existing regulation, in a protected space 
provided by legal interstices in the incumbent command-and-control regime. 
With this a proof-of-principle became established for the working of 
emission markets, even if the actual Performance of the initial configuration 
remained below expectations. 
Looking back, a scientific trajectory emerged throughout the 1960s and 
1970s with new findings in economic theory. With the conceptualization of 
tradable permits as an alternative to command-and-control and taxes (Coase, 
1960) the establishment of emission markets became an option for 
Controlling environmental pollution (Dales 1968). A vigorous debate among 
economic theorists about the pros and cons of permits versus charges resulted 
in a refined articulation of the concept, its representation in economic models 
and an assemblage of arguments for its superiority over taxes including 
formal theoretical proof (Montgomery, 1972). In an abstract and pnncipled 
form new options for emissions regulation were invented during the course of 
this debate. 
Environmental governance, however, was only just about to become 
established at that time. Regulatory practice became shaped in implementing 
facility-oriented emission Standards from the US Clean Air Act. In 1970 the 
US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was set up and environmental 
regulation started to show an effect, including upcoming Opposition from 
targeted industries who put the infant regime under pressure, for example, by 
132 The Governance of Innovation 
circulating the idiom of a 'growth ban'. Attempting the balance between 
statutory provisions and interest groups EPA officials tinkered with 'flexible 
regulation'. A first instance was the 'bubble concept', developed between 
1972 and 1975, which allowed the breaching of Standards for one particular 
facility, if it was compensated by emissions below the Standards at another 
facility of the same Company. The 'offset mechanism' extended this concept 
to compensation across companies, one year later; so that a first limited 
market for emission rights became established. The offset mechanism was 
accommodated with the legal framework of the Clean Air Act (CAA) in 1977 
- officially not as a policy shift, but as pragmatic repair work within the 
existing command-and-control regime (Cook, 1988). It did represent an 
interstice within the regime, however. The opening was used by young 
entrepreneurial economists at the EPA who 'cast about for new initiatives 
which they could hook their stars to and use to separate themselves from the 
crowd' (Meidinger, 1985, pp. 462-3). They set up a development programme 
for market based environmental regulation, starting from the practice of 
flexible regulation and linking it with the theory of tradable permits. A 
protected space within the EPA was provided by the Office of Planning and 
Evaluation (later Office of Planning and Management, OPM) as an 
institutional stronghold for economic concepts in regulation (Cook, 1988). 
Within this protected space first developments for emissions trading as a 
new policy instrument took place in the shadow of broad public debates 
about political values and regulatory culture with resources in the form of 
economic knowledge and institutional authority provided by the OPM and 
broader linkages to the regulatory reform movement. 'The offset policy 
provided a window of opportunity, albeit initially a narrowly opened one, 
allowing EPA reformers room to manoeuvre in exploring alternative control 
strategies with at least the semblance of incentive characteristics' (Cook, 
1988, p. 46). 
In 1977 emissions trading was not more than an abstract model of tradable 
permits, on the one hand, and highly contextual, improvized practices of 
flexible regulation, on the other hand. It was something that Rip and Schot, in 
their conception of technological innovation call a 'hopeful monstrosity (...): 
füll of promise, but not able to perform very well' (2001, p. 162). From early 
on, the development of market-based regulation was based on the promise of 
more efficient and less contentious regulation: markets would smoothly 
organize themselves without much political intervention and minimise the 
resistance of business actors to environmental protection measures. The 
promise worked to mobilize resources. After 1978 the OPM 'grafted 
economic incentives in an incremental and piecemeal fashion on an existing 
directive framework' (Marcus, 1980, p. 171). The result was a programme 
initially called 'controlled regulation'. In 1979 'emission reduction credits' 
were introduced as a currency for emissions amounts below Standards. 
Further support came from the Reagan Administration's agenda for 
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'regulatory relief in 1980 (Cook, 1988, pp. xi-xii, 1-2). In 1982 the EPA 
presented a proposal for an 'Emissions Trading Policy Statement. General 
Principles for Creation, Banking, and Use of Emission Reduction Units'. 
Part of these early developments was an increasing articulation of 
promises and requirements. Tinkering gave way to more systematic and 
coordinated research and development. For business actors to support the 
scheme it was necessary to assure the liquidity of the emission markets and 
avoid volatility of prices and related risks. This requirement shaped 
development efforts so that 'banking' was introduced as a new design 
component to smooth price development. This further sophistication of the 
design of emission markets created promises for other actors such as the 
finance industry who realized that trading and banking of emission 
certificates could be a future business field. Again, new requirements were 
added to assure that markets of emission certificates were compatible with 
the established financial market regime and its regulations and routines. The 
development agenda successively became more complex and more powerful 
in terms of the resources that were devoted to it. A promise-requirement 
cycle, as can be observed in the processes of technological innovation, had 
kicke'd in and boosted early developments of emissions trading in the 
protected space within the CAA (Van Lente, 1993; Van Lente and Rip, 
1998). Promise and requirement created momentum to overcome internal 
resistance to the innovation at EPA, for example by engineers and lawyers 
who had a central role in command-and-control regulation and feared 
devaluation of their competences (Cook, 1988, p. 4). 
The EPA programme was a laboratory creation and survived within the 
particular political space created by offset and OPM. Some first checks of 
compatibility with public opinion and legal frameworks, however, have taken 
place at this early stage. Elements of the EPA's emissions trading programme 
were repeatedly contested at the courts, mainly by environmental NGOs who 
found it ethically unacceptable to put pollution on sale. A key point was the 
legal framing of emission reduction credits. The term 'property right', which 
was proposed by economic theorists, had to be substituted by the term 
'allowance' in order to retain legal powers of the State vis-a-vis the holders of 
permits (Tietenberg, 2002). Legal contestation and internal controversy at 
EPA delayed issuance of a final version of the Emissions Trading Policy 
Statement until December 1986. 
In 1985 a first evaluation study of the EPA's emissions trading programme 
was published. The working of the configuration was assessed against the 
theory of tradable permit markets (Tietenberg, 1985). This pulled the nascent 
policy scheme out from under the shadow of the command-and-control 
regime and highlighted it as a first instance of a new policy instrument in 
practice, a proof of the principle that emission reduction obligations could be 
traded From the viewpoint of business, however, the new options for 
flexibility did not receive much attention. Banking and trading of emission 
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credits was only sporadically used and did not result in any considerable cost 
reductions (Tietenberg, 1985). Most of these deficiencies were attributed to 
the fact that the theoretical design principles were not yet implemented 
systematically. 
STEPPING OUT INTO THE REAL WORLD WITH A 
PROTOTYPE: PROJECT 88 AND TRANSFORMATION OF 
US CLEAN AIR POLICY 
A second phase with major importance for the development of emissions 
trading sees the configuration of the US Acid Rain Program as a prototype 
that is actually designed and presented as a new form of governance in its 
own right. This emissions trading exemplar explicitly combined economic 
theory with regulatory experiences from the EPA programme and was 
announced as a paradigmatic shift towards market-based environmental 
governance. The prototype induced many attempts at reproduction within and 
outside the USA. Several of these attempts were successful in the USA and 
worked to transform clean air governance from command-and-control to 
market-based patterns. Leading up to the development and implementation of 
the prototype was a comprehensive process of alignment and agenda building 
within environmental policy networks, labelled Project 88. 
Normally, a radical innovation such as emissions trading would be 
expected to find difficulties in acceptance. In the context of the EPA 
Programme this was the case. The instrument had been kept in its niche, 
officially leaving the command-and-control regime intact. The wider world 
of environmental governance and political discourse in general, however, 
was undergoing some changes during the 1980s. 
The problem of acid rain moved onto the political agenda, adding to the 
problem of health effects from local air pollution. The environmental 
movement gained broad support in society. At the same time, international 
competition increased, financial deficits grew, and trust in government 
eroded. The Reagan Administration championed regulatory reform for a 
business-friendly society. These parallel developments furthered social 
cleavages around the conceptual Opposition of ecology and economy. During 
the 1980s, several unsuccessful legislative proposals were launched to extend 
the application of emission Standards from new sources to existing sources. 
Although accompanied by flexibility and burden-sharing mechanisms, 
industrial and regional interests in the House, Senate and the Reagan 
Administration blocked off any political measures against acid rain in the 
1980s (Ellermann et al., 2000, p. 20). 
It was against this background that emissions trading entered the next 
phase of its innovation journey. Around 1988, on the occasion of another 
presidential election in the USA, a broad ränge of political interests, notably 
Innovation of Governance 135 
from industry as well from the environmental movement, became enrolled in 
a concerted effort to feature emissions trading as a Solution to reconcile 
environmental and economic interests and overcome the stalemate in acid 
rain policy. In the wake of the election campaigns, a coalition of policy 
entrepreneurs initiated Project 88 as 'a non-partisan effort to find innovative 
solutions to major environmental and natural resource problems' (Project 88, 
1988, p. ix).3 With Project 88, emissions trading left its protected space and 
stepped out into the wider world of environmental politics. Pioneering parts 
of the administration and other users, legal frameworks, existing policy 
instruments, interest groups, and issues in public discourse became integrated 
as part of the configuration. Extensive consultation with key figures from 
industry, environmental NGOs, government and academia produced a report 
entitled 'Harnessing Market Forces to Protect the Environment'. The report 
paved the way for a broad political coalition by framing environmental policy 
as a question of technical design, independent of contending values and 
political positions: 'Project 88 steps away from ongoing debates over specific 
environmental goals, to focus instead on finding better mechanisms for 
achieving whatever Standards are set' (Project 88, 1988, p. ix). 
When the new Administration moved into office it started the 
implementation of a prototype. Project 88 was sent into a second round so as 
to ensure embedding in the political context. The prototype followed the 
design of a cap-and-trade system that represented the State of the art in 
economic theory. Looking back in 1991, when introducing proposals to 
include emissions trading into the Clean Air Act, President Bush said: 'Let 
me commend Project 88 and groups like the Environmental Defense Fund for 
bringing creative solutions to long-standing problems, for not only breaking 
the mold, but helping to build a new one' (Project 88, Round II, 1991, p. 2). 
Final rules for emissions trading were adopted in January 1993. By 1994 a 
market had developed. 
The other side of successfully stepping out into the wider world is that the 
messiness of reality breaks into the design. The US Clean Air Act was meant 
to be an example of emissions trading as discussed in economic theory. The 
transferral of the instrument from economics textbooks to political reality, 
however, brought several problems to the fore: in economic theory 
distributive effects were neglected, because in the world of market models 
they do not have an impact on the overall efficiency of the instrument. In the 
policy process they came to the fore and fed conflicts about alternative forms 
of allocating emissions reduction allowances and various other details of 
design (Eilermann et al., 2000, p. 27). The proposal by the administration 
also raised concern with respect to the feasibility and ethical acceptability of 
emissions trading - this time in larger circles than the few experts that had 
followed the development of the EPA mechanisms. In a complex 
consteilation of involved parties with diverging interests and under high time 
pressure the neat theoretical concept of emissions trading had to be broken up 
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and additional elements be introduced to repair it. Compromises and ad hoc 
developments were rationalized in order to defend the project on the ground 
of the promise of efficiency in order to stabilize support for ongoing 
development work and secure acceptance by target groups and the wider 
public. In effect, as one of the later evaluators of the instrument has termed it, 
'Title IV is built on more or less arbitrary emission limits, trading to reduce 
costs, and an allowance-allocation scheme that is at least as messy as most 
tax legislation and that has a history with no more nobility' (Ellermann et al., 
2000, pp. 316-17). 
Throughout the 1990s emissions trading became wide spread and accepted 
as an environmental policy instrument in the United States. Several emissions 
trading schemes became established on a regional level in the United States 
and the concept of market-based regulation gained dominance. In 1994 the 
EPA required states to establish market-based systems of regulation in order 
to achieve national air quality Standards. A prominent example is the 
Regional Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM) for the regulation of NOx 
and S0 2 in the Los Angeles area (Harrison, 1999). RECLAIM was developed 
in parallel with the US Acid Rain Program from 1990 to 1993. It went into 
Operation in 1994. Other examples that gained some international visibility 
are the NOx Budget Program that was set up in 1999 and comprises nine 
states in the Northeast of the United States, and the Illinois VOC trading 
scheme established in 1999 for the Chicago area. 
At the same time, there was continued resistance internationally and, 
especially, in Europe. While also in Europe the prototype induced some 
activity in exploration and development of emissions trading for regulating 
air pollution, for example, a proposal for S0 2 emission regulation in the 
United Kingdom (Sorrell, 1999) and a proposal by the business Community in 
Norway (Hoibye, 1999), regulatory culture, institutions and balance of 
interest groups provided a less favourable selection environment in Europe. 
The proposals therefore failed to gain support in the legislative process. 
Scepticism about the promises of market models was deeply anchored, and 
these were also ethical and political concerns about shifting responsibility for 
emission reduction away from polluters. Command-and-control based 
regimes of environmental regulation were stronger in many European 
countries than in the US, with incumbent interests and institutional inertia 
making radical innovation more difficult (Woerdman, 2002; Cass, 2005). 
Six years after it started, the US Acid Rain Program was evaluated as a 
great success with respect to economic as well as ecological goals. One 
commentator emphasized that '(t)he explanation must lie in departures from 
the textbook world of perfect rationality, perfect competition, and perfect 
certainty, in which the system always follows the long-run equilibrium path -
that is, in mistakes, market imperfections, and forecasting errors' (Eilermann 
et al., 2000, p. 299). Unintended effects helped to boost the instrument: it 
turned out that low-sulphur coal was much more widely available than 
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forecasted, because of a considerable drop in rail transport rates due to the 
liberalization of railroads in the 1980s. This meant that low sulphur coal 
became widely available as an alternative to the installation scrubbers 
(Eilermann et al., 2000, pp. 104-5). Whether these additional factors were 
recognized or not, the prototype was recommended for large-scale 
application: 'We believe that our analysis of the U.S. Acid Rain Program 
supports a number of general lessons ... The experience ... clearly 
establishes that large-scale tradable permits programs can work more or less 
as textbooks describe' (Eilermann et al., 2000, p. 315). 
With the US Acid Rain Program as a working exemplar in place, however, 
'the concept of harnessing market forces to protect the environment has gone 
from being politically anathema to politically correct' (Stavins, 2002, p. 1). 
At least in US environmental policy, 'market-based instruments have moved 
centre stage, and policy debates look very different from the time when these 
ideas were characterized as Ticenses to pollute' or dismissed as completely 
impractical' (Stavins, 2002, p. 14). 
REGIME FORMATION: LINKAGE WITH 
INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY, EU EMISSIONS 
TRADING, AND THE CARBON INDUSTRY 
Emissions trading's innovation journey did not come to an end with 
becoming established in the domain of US environmental governance. It 
branched out into other domains, found interstices to gain ground in and 
flourish. Emissions trading became linked to the nascent governance 
framework of international climate policy. When it met resistance on this 
level it shot further branches into governance domains at the level of 
transnational corporations. Oil companies BP and Shell became loci for the 
implementation of first examples of greenhouse gas emissions trading 
schemes. The transnational scope of these corporate schemes provided 
bridgeheads for the policy instrument to travel across the world and link up 
with European policy networks. The instrument gained support from the 
OECD and business corporations worldwide. Its constituency became 
institutionalized, one example being by founding a global association to 
promote emissions trading. In connection with revisions of energy market 
and climate policy regulations, Denmark and the UK were the first countries 
to Start developing national emissions trading schemes for greenhouse gases. 
The cumulation of these developments on various governance levels created 
a global hype around emissions trading as the instrument of future 
environmental policy. It nurtured the expectation that emissions trading 
would come anyway and reversed scepticism and criticism in European 
policy circles into widespread attempts to become part of the emerging 
movement. Finally, the withdrawal by the US government from international 
138 The Governance of Innovation 
climate negotiations freed the European Union (EU) Commission to pursue 
emission trading on its own terms - after carefiilly reframing the instrument 
that it had so firmly contested on the international level. The Commission 
orchestrated the development of a European directive as a framework for 
interlinked emissions trading systems in 25 member states. Implementation 
of the directive nurtured national constituencies of emissions trading and 
gave rise to an emerging global regime for development and Operation of 
emissions trading. Although reconfiguring governance structures throughout 
Europe led into diverging trajectories, in which the design became adapted 
and repaired to fit existing political circumstances in national domains, the 
global regime around the instrument, together with the authority of the EU 
Commission can be observed to effectively work to establish design 
Standards. Currently, it seems as if the instrument, in form of the global 
regime to which it gave rise, has taken on a life of its own, quite independent 
of ongoing problem cycles and politics within any singular governance 
domain. 
With international climate negotiations an opportunity opened up for 
emissions trading to branch out from US clean air policy into other 
governance domains. US diplomats, with the support of the international 
business Community, pressed international emissions trading into the Kyoto 
Protocol - against resistance from the EU who feared that reduction 
commitments could be evaded by importing excess emissions rights (hot air) 
from former socialist countries (Oberthür and Ott, 1999, pp. 188-90; Damro 
and Luaces Mendez, 2003, p. 76). The development of a working rule system 
for international emissions trading under the Kyoto Protocol was finally 
stranded because the EU insisted on limiting trading to 50 per cent of 
required emission reductions (Woerdman, 2002, pp. 350-84; Cass, 2005). 
This was not the only route, however, along which the innovation network 
branched out from the US clean air policy. When international negotiations 
reached stalemate Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) set up an initiative to 
encourage business corporations to move ahead with Company internal 
trading schemes for carbon emission allowances as a means to demonstrate 
their support for the instrument and show that it is feasible to apply it to 
greenhouse gases. In 1998 BP indeed announced the introduction of such a 
scheme. Shell followed soon after (Zapfel and Vainio, 2002, p. 8). The BP 
and Shell schemes attracted attention as the first applications of emissions 
trading to greenhouse gases. These examples allowed the instrument to travel 
through conferences and Workshops to Europe and around the world and link 
up with discourses of local policy and business circles (Christiansen and 
Wettestad, 2003, p. 9). Towards the end of the 1990s the OECD also picked 
up tradable permits and emissions trading as a pet proposal for which it could 
provide review and dissemination services and manifest its role a as a neutral 
policy broker and testing agency (OECD, 1997; OECD/IEA, 2004). 
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Increasingly also actors beyond established environmental policy networks 
became enrolled in the innovation network: '(•••) market intermediaries and 
other potential Service providers (auditing companies, Consultants, lawyers, 
academics, commercial conference organisers) saw a potential market arising 
and were more than Willing to invest some resources under the header of 
business development' (Zapfel and Vainio, 2002, p. 7). Their 'helper's 
interest' (Prittwitz, 1990, pp. 116-21) brought forward exploratory studies 
and R&D activities in Europe that were justified by the need to be prepared 
for upcoming policy debates. Part of the dynamics in these years was the 
emergence of what is now called the carbon industry - an increasingly 
organized sector of specialized businesses that provide service for the 
development and maintenance of emissions markets. Emissions trading 
gained additional momentum - not only as an environmental policy 
instrument, but also as a thriving service economy that started to actively 
advertise its products and lobby for the expansion of its market. 
In the context of these ongoing developments on a supra- and sub-national 
level, policy initiatives started to take shape, also on a national level in 
Europe. In 1999 Denmark introduced the first emissions trading scheme in 
Europe (Pedersen, 2000, pp. 3-5). In the UK business actors set up an 
Emissions Trading Group (ETG) to develop a voluntary scheme as an 
alternative to tax proposals. With the ETG a European bridgehead of the 
emissions trading innovation network became established. Central actors 
from the US emission trading innovation network participated regularly in 
working group sessions (Smith, 2004, pp. 83^1). In 2002 the UK government 
endorsed and financially supported a pilot scheme developed by the ETG on 
the grounds of 'to enable business to gain practical experience of emissions 
trading ahead of a European and international system, and to help the City of 
London establish itself as a global centre for emissions trading' (UK gov. 
dept. of environment, Defra, press release, 12 May 2003: 'Commentary on 
preliminary Ist year results and 2002 transaction log'). 
Because of such investments and activities, the expectation of something 
new and big Coming up in environmental policy was rising. A global hype 
started around emissions trading as the policy instrument of the future. There 
was 'a conference on emissions trading somewhere in the world every day, 
each accompanied by a raft of papers from universities, think tanks, and 
government agencies. In less than a decade, emissions trading has gone from 
being a pariah among policymakers to being a star - everybody's favourite 
way to deal with pollution problems' (Eilermann et al., 2000, p. 4). Europe 
was still rejecting emissions trading under the Kyoto Protocol, but European 
policy development networks were part of the hype. More and more believed 
that emissions trading would come, anyway, and that it would only be 
sensible to get involved - and the more who believed in it the more likely it 
became that this would happen. This made it difficult to be against emissions 
trading. Around 2000 a reversal happened in Europe. Academics, analysts, 
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Consultants, environmental interest groups and others who were critical of 
emissions trading, turned into supporters, the debate shifted from the question 
of ' i f to 'how' (Zapfel and Vainio, 2002, pp. 9-10). The hype enrolled 
important centres of policy development in Europe to the emissions trading 
innovation network. US experts frequently travelled to Europe for lecturing 
and Consulting. Reports, technical terms, design principles, metaphors etc. 
started to circulate across the Atlantic (Zapfel and Vainio, 2002, pp. 7-8). 
The European Commission became a hub of informal consultations and 
exploration of emissions trading as a policy instrument for domestic climate 
policy. The Commission hired US experts and started to take on the role of a 
policy entrepreneur for emissions trading within the EU while keeping up 
resistance against international emissions trading under the Kyoto Protocol 
(Wettestad, 2005, p. 16). Cass (2005) explains this divergence by 'norm-
entrapment' on the side of the EU, resulting from earlier strategies of 
delegitimizing emissions trading as an attempt of the USA to water down 
emission reduction commitments. So, even when large parts of European 
policy networks had already become supporters of the instrument, the EU 
was trapped by the normative objections against the instrument that it had 
raised earlier. When the USA withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol in 2001 the 
next critical juncture arose. The EU was urged to take over the lead in 
climate policy and demonstrate concrete successes in order to keep the 
international process alive (Wettestad, 2005, p. 16). Substantial effort, 
however, had to be invested to reframe emissions trading: from a Strategie 
device to water down binding emission reduction commitments in the hands 
of the USA, into an effective and efficient instrument for the EU. The main 
argument was that the problem of 'hot air' (excess emission rights for former 
socialist countries due to deindustrialization) did not apply to an EU-wide 
trading scheme. Another important factor made a particularly good fit of 
emissions trading with the domain of European climate policy at that time: 
while the Commission had worked without success for years for an 
unanimity vote of the Council on a proposal for a European energy tax, 
emissions trading (as a non-fiscal measure) was allowed to move ahead on 
the basis of a majority vote only (Christiansen and Wettestad, 2003, pp. 6-7). 
In 2001 the Commission tabled a draft Directive to establish the EU-ETS. 
The proposal acknowledged the diversity of political and technical 
circumstances on the level of member states by providing a mere framework 
to be filled by National Allocation Plans (NAP), which should speeify 
concrete designs. In an 'ultra-quick process' the Directive became adopted in 
2003 for the EU-ETS to commence in 2005 (Wettestad, 2005). 
In the course of domesticating emissions trading within national policy 
contexts a tension became apparent between the need for standardized design 
for compatibility of emission markets and particular social, technical, 
environmental and - above all - political conditions in the respective settings 
of implementation. Powerful political interests, policy legacies, legal 
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frameworks and specific industry structure required repair work and partial 
re-innovation to arrive at configurations that could work, embedded in 
peculiar contexts of use. Ongoing conflicts between the European 
Commission and member states over the acceptability of various special 
shapes give ample evidence of these difficulties, but also show that approval 
of NAPs by the Commission - as one of the elements of the EU-ETS 
framework design - establishes an effective mechanism for the 
standardization of policy instruments. 
From 2005 onwards, the EU-ETS established a European market of 
allowances for 2.2 billion tons of carbon emissions from 11500 installations. 
In 2006 the daily transaction volume in emission allowances reached €60 
million. Linked to this was a fundamental transformation of basic structures 
of environmental governance. Tradable permits and certificates of all kinds 
have become State of the art in environmental regulation, and there is hardly 
any problem to which they are not applied even in an exploratory manner. 
Linked to this shift are a stronger role for economic expertise and a reframing 
of the pollution problem from moral condemnation to efficient allocation. 
Attached to the new paradigm in policy development is a social infrastructure 
of specialized skills, professional careers, organizations and, in the case of 
emissions trading, the peculiar phenomenon of the carbon industry as a whole 
new service economy that prospers around emission allowances as an 
artificially created commodity. One can speak of a new regime that has 
developed around emissions trading as a technology of governance. Various 
parts of the working configuration (such as public agencies, trading 
departments in companies, auditors for emissions) plus elements of the multi-
level infrastructure of policy development (newly created departments in 
public administration, think tanks, consultancy and law firms) and the carbon 
industry (project developers, traders, banks, exchanges), rely upon and 
mutually reinforce each other. This regime holds emissions trading in place -
and it creates additional momentan. Even if, over the coming years, some of 
the great promises of efficiency and effectiveness become deconstructed in 
scientific and political debate (for example, by highlighting transaction costs 
and other hidden costs of regulation or focusing on the distortion of textbook 
designs in real world politics), there is still a good chance that the instrument 
will be retained, and expanded and branch out into other governance 
domains. There are developments under way to include air traffic into the 
EU-ETS and to establish links between European climate policy with 
regional initiatives for greenhouse gas emission trading in the USA and in 
other countries such as Japan and Canada. A vision that guides these 
stabilizing interactions across national policy development communities is a 
global emission market of interlinked mutually compatible trading systems. 
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REGIMES AROUND TECHNOLOGIES OF GOVERNANCE 
Studying the case of emissions trading as an innovation journey in 
governance brings an interesting new aspect to the fore: the policy instrument 
builds a specialized social constituency and gives rise to the formation of a 
transnational regime. Regime formation is visible in the emergence actor 
networks, codified knowledge and institutions that are grouped around the 
instruments and are specifically targeted at making it operational and 
developing it further. In the case of emissions trading, national and 
international markets for emission allowances form an entirely new business 
sector that depends on the policy instrument being in place and working. In 
contrast to established notions of regimes in the context of governance 
studies (for example Gehring, 1994; Black, 2005) this regime is not centred 
on a problem area (such as international climate policy), but on a policy 
instrument, a particular technology of governance. The regime can be 
conceptualized as a 'technological regime' in governance: 'A technological 
regime is the rule-set or grammar embedded in a complex of engineering 
practices, production process technologies, product characteristics, skills and 
procedures, ways of handling relevant artifacts and persons, ways of defining 
Problems - all of them embedded in institutions and infrastructures' (Rip and 
Kemp, 1998, p. 338). In the case of emissions trading a specific 'rule-set or 
grammar' of governance is embedded in policy theories, skills and expertise 
of policy analysts, public administrators and 'carbon market' Professionals, 
specific emission market institutions and special interest organizations. The 
interdependence of these elements and their direct connection with emissions 
trading as a working configuration in governance gives momentan to policy 
development. 
Such a view on the social life of policy instruments complements an 
established understanding of policy instruments as ideas or cognitive 
constructs (Majone, 1991; Howlett and Ramesh, 1993; Dolowitz and Marsh, 
1996). The concept of technological regimes in governance offers a view on 
policy instruments as social entities, quasi-actors and institutional trajectories 
in their own right. For the technological regime the instrument becomes an 
end in itself. By way of (collective) political activities and participation in 
public discourses the social constituency of the instrument gains influence on 
problem definitions and policy goals in governance domains. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The innovation perspective on policy development that I adopted for the case 
study on emission trading brought aspects to the fore that are grounded in 
studies that take problem- or domain-oriented approaches to governance. The 
innovation journey of a single instrument across policy areas and 
Innovation of Governance 143 
jurisdictions has shown that it has a life of its own. In historical dynamic 
analysis the development of emissions trading appears as a process with 
twists and turns extending over three decades. Design, legitimacy and 
attributed Performance characteristics of the policy instrument have changed 
over the course of its life, shaped by a distributed agency, and a formation of 
networks and linkages with contexts of implementation. 
An important insight is that, as the instrument matures, it develops a 
specialized social constituency and becomes institutionalized in the form of a 
transnational regime. Instruments are not only ideas that passively wait to be 
picked up and enacted, but they can take on characteristics of collective 
actors that actively promote solutions, looking for problems and seeking to 
create political demand. Dealing with innovation in governance thus 
resembles dealing with innovation in material technologies such as 
automobiles or photovoltaics. These technologies represent autonomous 
social constituencies with their own institutions and dynamics. They can get 
'out of control' (Winner, 1977). This means that policy instruments cannot 
easily be chosen from the textbook or be transferred from one context to 
another by reference to their basic operational principle. Finally, the 
differentiation of a specialized social subsector for the development and 
maintenance of a particular policy instrument - which is especially relevant 
in the case of the global carbon industry - emphasizes the relevance of 
research into technological dynamics in governance. Understanding political 
transformations such as the emergence of 'new modes of governance' seems 
to be limited by a focus on shifting ideology, institutions or actor 
constellations and the effect on the choice of policy instruments. Policy 
instruments are not only dependent variables. To some degree, especially in a 
more mature State of development, policy instruments may themselves shape 
some of the framework conditions of their application and on their part make 
a choice with respect to the problems to which they could potentially be 
applied. In perspective, this points to a revised understanding of the co-
evolution of policy instruments and governance, similar to the co-evolution 
of technology and industry structure (Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1994). 
Studying the development of a policy instrument as an innovation process 
in governance has proven fruitful for this pilot study. The innovation journey 
concept was able to deliver an appropriate heuristic for the development of 
emissions trading. The case turned out to be a clear-cut example, ideal to 
demonstrate the added value of an innovation perspective on governance. In 
other cases it may not always be possible to reconstruct the innovation 
journey with the conceptual elements at hand. Some hypothetical 
generalizations, however, may be drawn for other economic instruments, 
especially those that are based on expert knowledge of sophisticated 
theoretical constructs and that give rise to new markets for advice and 
services. For deeper and more valid insights into the dynamics of 
technologies of governance, however, more case studies are needed for 
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different kinds of policy instruments. This could lead into the identification 
of di f ferent patterns of co-evolution between policy instruments and 
governance with varying elements of ' push ' and 'pu l l ' . 
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NOTES 
1. This article draws in large parts on Voß, 2007a. 
2. The policy studies literature is diverse in itself. It has moved far beyond a simple 
stages model of the policy process (for an overview see Sabatier, 1999). Most 
concepts of policy change and learning, however, view policy instruments as 
secondary elements of governance patterns and assume that instruments follow 
basic political beliefs, problem perceptions and dominant goals, rather than having 
dynamics of their own (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Hall, 1993; Howlett and 
Ramesh, 1993; Linder and Peters, 1998; Maier et al., 2003). 
3. Project 88 was formally a study. In effect it was a focused strategy of coalition 
building. Key actors behind Project 88 were two senators who sponsored the 
project (Timothy E. Wirth, Colorado, and John Heinz, Pennsylvania), economist 
Robert Stavins, Professor for public policy at Harvard and former official of the 
Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), who managed it: 'EDF was a major 
participant in the Project 88 effort and worked closely with White House staff to 
develop the administration's Clean Air Act proposal ( . . .) ' (Hahn and Stavins, 
1991, p. 24). 
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